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Silicon Valley employers employ few African-Americans, Latino/as, or older work-
ers, yet do not fit the usual paradigms of employment discrimination: they exhibit
no taste for uniformity and do not employ job tournaments or internal labor mar-
kets. A new model of employment discrimination attributes disparate hiring in
Silicon Valley to a combination of: demands for specific skill sets at hiring (the op-
posite of the subjective criteria that have long beguiled scholars of discrimination)
and concomitant refusal to train; hiring through networks of personal contacts;
and rewards to career paths that alternate employment with self-employment.
Overcoming the disparate impact of these employment practices will require in-
stitutions going well beyond current employment discrimination law.
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Employment Discrimination in a High-Velocity Labor Market: how a meritocracy
creates disparate labor market outcomes through demands for skills at hiring,
hiring through networks, and rewards to entrepreneurship*
by Alan Hyde**
Silicon Valley is the true land of opportunity, "the MOST meritocratic labor
market I've seen anywhere in the world," according to one of its leading observers.  1
Programmers, engineers, designers have poured in from all over the world, knowing no
one, but willing to work hard, and have achieved remarkable economic success.  "I make
integrated circuits," says T.J. Rogers, the blunt President and CEO of Cypress
Semiconductors, "and electrons obey the laws of nature, and they don't care if the
engineer pushing them is male or female, black or white or brown."2
Silicon Valley is rife with discrimination, one of the most unequal labor markets
in a country with generally skewed earnings distributions.   African-American and3
Latino/a representation in the workforce of any of the large employers is so low, below 4
percent, as to invite litigation, were the employer a Home Depot.   Engineers older than4
40 often feel they are essentially unemployable.    Many high tech firms have a fraternity5
house atmosphere, full of men with undeveloped social skills and demanding long hours
of employees.  Sexual relations with coworkers are common and many are harassing.  6
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Menial manufacturing and maintenance jobs are performed by poorly-paid members of
immigrant groups without possibilities for advancement.7
It is not necessary to choose between these accounts.  Both are true. 
Understanding how both are true can illuminate much about the nature of discrimination
in American labor markets generally.  I will argue that Silicon Valley's high-velocity
labor market offers a particularly vivid example of several trends in the larger labor
market, trends that existing discrimination law (and literature) do not deal with well, or at
all.  The Valley can be proud of the success of its immigrants, particularly Asian.  This
success shows the declining significance of overt--perhaps, even covert-- racial and
ethnic discrimination.   The Valley's practice of hiring for very specific skills, without
additional requirements that applicants “fit” into firm culture, is a bulwark against certain
kinds of discrimination.    So are the internet job sites and agencies that reinforce this8
culture of immediate skills.   Finally, as shown below, its entrepreneurial culture of start-9
ups and careers across firms help ameliorate any residual discrimination against Asians,
and could conceivably be made to ameliorate other discrimination.
Yet Silicon Valley also shows that African-Americans and Latinos and Latinas, as
groups, may still do poorly even in a labor market that is rapidly expanding and hires
from many nonwhite groups.  At least three reasons for this failure seem particularly
important in explaining Silicon Valley.  While all three have been discussed in the
academic literature, putting them together provides a distinct model of discrimination (or
disparate labor market outcomes) that is different from the pictures assumed in
conventional law or economics.
First, employers put increased emphasis on present skills and relevant experience. 
They do not train employees or maintain ladders from assembly lines to white collar jobs,
as was true in the older industrial economy.  While from one perspective this is highly
meritocratic, it may well have highly disparate outcomes across ethnic lines.
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The closest is Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2002), reversing13
summary judgment for HP on an individual’s claim of race and age discrimination..  Plaintiff alleged
retaliation against him after his activities on behalf of an advocacy group for African-American employees. 
While the group had the full approval of top HP management, plaintiff, who worked at a facility in
Colorado, alleged that local managers did not share this approval.  The court also expressed concern about
the entirely subjective nature of HP’s evaluation system.
See, e.g., Todd Wallack, Former Oracle Executive Sues Over Termination, SAN FRANCISCO14
CHRONICLE, May 13, 2000; see also Peter Delevett, HP Age-bias Lawsuit is All Relative, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEW S, Feb. 8, 2002 (age discrimination suit by cousin of Hewlett-Packard director).
Second, career ladders in high-velocity labor markets reward entrepreneurs who
at some point leave the employer, armed with information and contacts, and start a new
firm.   Yet for reasons not well understood, racial and ethnic groups differ sharply in10
their ability to make effective use of entrepreneurial options.
Third, people who hire, particularly founders of start-ups, may prefer people like
themselves and not experience this as prejudice against others.  This may be particularly
true in industries of interlocked firms dominated by a particular ethnic group, such as
computer distribution is for Taiwan-born Chinese.    This bears some resemblance to11
what some academics call, provocatively, "aversive racism."   I prefer, however, to view12
hiring through networks of contacts as an efficient reduction of information costs. All of
these phenomena exist outside of Silicon Valley and high-velocity labor markets, but
become even more acute within them, when turnover is heavy, hiring constant,
information low, and informal networks of contacts crucial. 
There are no reported legal cases of employment discrimination (other than
sexual harassment) against prominent Silicon Valley employers, and few unreported
cases that really address discrimination.   I am employing a somewhat subjective13
definition of "real employment discrimination" suits here, but not, I think, a controversial
one.  When the mercurial Larry Ellison at Oracle fires another executive who sues for his
or her stock options, that individual may throw in a count alleging race or sex
discrimination, and the case will eventually settle.   This, however, is not a "real14
discrimination" suit by my lights, and neither is a suit alleging sexual harassment by a
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boss against a single employee.   The unreported discrimination cases that I have found15
all raise highly individual claims of this type.  I do not believe there has ever been a suit
challenging a firm's practice applying to more than a single individual.    Yet, if I am
correct in identifying demand for skills at hiring, contacts in networks, and unequal
entrepreneurism, as the three most likely explanations for the Valley's low employment
rates for African-Americans and Latinos/as, it is entirely possible that employers might
be vulnerable to successful suits alleging discrimination.  The social pressures against
bringing such suits are great, analogous to, though different from, the social pressures
against employers' suing to protect their trade secrets.   16
Yet it seems only a matter of time before Silicon Valley hiring goes under the
litigation microscope.  When that happens, the legal system will be faced with an
extraordinarily difficult choice.  It could redefine concepts of discrimination so that most
Valley employers would end up in violation of the statute.  Arguably, this might not even
require "redefinition."  As we shall see, statistics on African-American hiring in
particular are so poor that employers might already be guilty of what lawyers call
"disparate treatment, statistically proven."  But would this be a good idea?  How would
such discrimination be remedied?  Are the personnel practices associated with civil rights
remedies compatible with a high-velocity labor market?    Could Silicon Valley's
distinctive personnel practices: entrepreneurism and cross-firm careers, information
intermediaries, high turnover--be harnessed instead to serve employment equity?
Part I of this chapter reviews data on discrimination in Silicon Valley.  Part II
explains these patterns as the result of demand for skills at hiring, hiring through
networks, and unequal resort to entrepreneurism, and shows how these three phenomena
assume crucial importance with the decline of internal labor markets and the rise of high-
velocity labor markets.  Part III analyzes these practices under the law of employment
discrimination and concludes that some large Valley employers might be discriminatory,
in a legal sense.  Part IV discusses why, if this is the case, there are no employment
discrimination suits, for practical purposes, in the Valley.  Part V looks to the future and
discusses whether the high-velocity personnel practices that have generated such wealth
for so many, can be made to work better for those who have yet to benefit from them--or
whether, by contrast, expanding legal remedies to include Silicon Valley's disparate
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I. Protected Groups in the Silicon Valley Labor Market
A. Asians: the success story
More than a third, 34.1%, of the population of Santa Clara County reported in the
2000 census was born in another country.   Fifty-seven (57.3%) of that group was born17
in Asia.     The ratios were similar in the 1990 census, further analyzed by AnnaLee18
Saxenian to focus specifically on the high technology workforce.  She found that thirty
percent of the high technology workforce of Silicon Valley was foreign-born in 1990,
one-third of scientists and engineers.    Of that one-third in 1990, two-thirds were born in
Asia, half Chinese, about a quarter Indian, and the rest mostly divided among Viet Nam,
the Philippines, Japan, and Korea.   Close to a quarter of technology firms started in the19
Valley between 1980 and 1998 had CEOs with Chinese or Indian surnames.     Po20
Bronson describes one of these, KillerApp.com, founded by Ben Chiu, Taiwan-born, who
arrived in the Valley knowing no one, was turned down for money all along Sand Hill
Road, and eventually sold the company for almost $50 million.  "The definitive smell21
inside a Silicon Valley start-up was of curry."  22
People who describe Silicon Valley as a meritocracy are thinking of stories like
these.  It is not my purpose to debunk them.   Silicon Valley's strength is its openness to
hard workers from whatever origin.  Openness to immigrants is a significant part of the
Valley's advantage over Boston and Austin, and something all these high-technology
districts share in comparison with foreign equivalents.   Silicon Valley participates in23
global production networks, and for those in the Valley who experience that globalism
every day, meritocracy and nondiscrimination are daily experiences, and have been for
many years.  For example, when Intel in 1983 opened new assembly plants in Chandler,
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Arizona, and Ireland, they were set up by engineers from Intel's Malaysian facility.  24
Two particular aspects of Asian success in the Valley, however, complicate the pure
model of careers open to talent: ethnic networks, and entrepreneurial options.  Each is
important.  Each reinforces the other.
Asian engineers' success reflects not only their individual effort, but the working
of formal and informal organization.    Informal ties are more important than formal25
organization.  Ben Chiu's story is an example.  As mentioned, his company, a comparison
shopping engine, was not funded by Sand Hill Road venture capital.  His investors were
Taiwanese.  Like the nightclub business in Taiwan that Chiu had left, Silicon Valley was
"guanxi all over again: connections."   His attorneys recommended a personal financial
adviser who had been accountant for Jerry Yang (of Yahoo!) and Mark Andriessen (of
Netscape), and that man introduced Chiu to investment bankers and facilitated the sale of
the company.   The several thousand Chinese- and Indian-born engineers who responded26
to a survey ranked their most important network to be family and friends, followed by
current and former colleagues, school alumni, members of formal ethnic associations,
and, in last place, other professional organizations.27
The start-ups founded by immigrant engineers also reflect, not simply the larger
start-up culture of Silicon Valley, but also the glass ceiling.  While Asians are
statistically overrepresented in professional positions in the Valley, they are less common
in managerial positions.  "A 1991 survey of Asian professionals in the region found that
two-thirds of those working in the private sector believed that advancement to
managerial positions was limited by race."    For those surveyed, this did not mean "racial
prejudice and stereotypes" so much as a perceived "old boys' network that excludes
Asians" and "lack of role models."    When these Asian professionals felt blocked in the28
companies for which they worked, they were particularly likely to start their own.
The New Economy, then, includes some very Old business forms: networks of
ethnically-linked businesses that provide goods or services to the larger community. 
These networks do not just involve Chinese laundries or Korean greengrocers, but the
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design, manufacture, and distribution of computers and components, linking California
with Taiwan or Singapore.    Asian networks dominate aspects of high technology that29
do not require particular scientific or technical expertise, and might otherwise represent
opportunities for other groups, such as distributing computers to retailers.  30
Retailing and distribution are not particularly high-tech jobs, but I include them
here for two reasons.  First, just because they don't require computer or engineering
skills, they might be a way for less-skilled workers to share in the wealth created by a
high-tech economy.  Second, we have a splendid ethnography of Chinese immigrant
computer distributors in Los Angeles that shows precisely why this business is not open
to anyone who might want to enter it.31
Chinese-owned companies constitute 25 percent of the companies that distribute
computers in Los Angeles County, despite making up only nine percent of retailers, and
less than three percent of the county population.  Virtually all the owners were born
outside the U.S., three-quarters in Taiwan, and came to the U.S. as adults.  Most became
computer distributors because of family members in the computer business, gained
experience in Chinese-owned firms, and now employ relatives in their own firm.  Even as
the companies grow larger, propensity to employ family members does not decline. 
Capital usually comes from the manufacturers in Taiwan, and otherwise
disproportionately from personal savings, friends, and Chinese-owned financial
institutions.  Unlike some ethnic enclaves, the workforce is not all Chinese.  Only thirty
percent of firms have an all-Chinese workforce, and twenty-nine percent have non-
Chinese managers.  However, jobs reflect ethnicity.  Whites typically work "in the front"
in sales or as secretaries; the technicians and accountants "in the back" are Chinese.  The
Mexicans work in shipping or assembly.  I have not found a similarly detailed study of
hardware distribution in Northern California, but this picture certainly seems to apply
there as well.
 B. Women: a pressing research agenda
There is an amazing absence of research on women as a group in the Silicon
Valley economy.  My impressions are just that: impressions.  In every interview I
conducted with a woman, for example in her capacity as human resources director or
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information manager, I always asked about distinct experiences of women as a group. 
These were nearly always denied to exist, in keeping with the general meritocratic ethos
of the Valley, but, in truth, as I probed respondents for more specific examples, these
rarely fell into clear patterns.
On balance, Silicon Valley appears to be an excellent place for women, as for
anyone who welcomes challenge and opportunity.  Women's economic gains largely
reflect incorporation into high-skilled and high-paid jobs within sectors.    One often32
encounters women who are vice-presidents or general counsels at an age where one
would not expect to find this "back East," as Californians say.   One of the few surveys of
Silicon Valley women was conducted in November 2000 of 826 women.  It reported that
some 51 percent of women think that advancement opportunities for women are better in
Silicon Valley than outside; 41 percent think they are about the same; and only 8 percent
think they are better outside.    Women nevertheless feel that opportunities for men are33
still better than for women (60 percent agreed with that statement).  Women in
technology are more than twice as likely as the general sample to agree that gender has
been a significant barrier to their career advancement (28 vs. 15 percent).  Some 41
percent of women in technology believe that they have to "fit into a masculine
workplace" in order to advance.34
While formal and informal networks restricted to women exist, they appear to be
much less influential than the Chinese or Indian networks.   Rather, the crucial network35
for women appears to be the relationship with the company founder (usually male). 
Companies with lots of women usually are companies that started with lots of women
brought in by the founder, and thereafter have lower levels of supervision.36
If women without family responsibility could be broken out for separate analysis,
it seems possible that their work experience would not differ from similarly-situated
men's, something that is increasingly true across the U.S. economy.  However, such
similarity is elusive for women with children.   The Women of Silicon Valley survey
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reported: "The number one source of stress for women in Silicon Valley  is in balancing
work with personal or family responsibilities.   Some 67% say that this balancing act
always or sometimes causes them stress."   Working hours are long and child care not37
available to meet the demand.  38
As mentioned, I have been unable to find a single lawsuit, reported or unreported,
alleging structural discrimination against women (or any other group).  There are,
however, some unreported suits alleging sexual harassment.    This is not surprising, for39
reasons explored in journalism on high technology companies elsewhere.   Companies40
filled with young people working extremely long hours are likely to see relationships
between coworkers.   Men in Silicon Valley are often arrogant, and often there are
suggestions that career advancement will be assisted by the relationship.  When it ends,
particularly if employment ends too, there may be a lawsuit.
 C. African-Americans and Latinos and Latinas: missing
You can spend a whole day at any large Silicon Valley employer and never see a
black face.  In 1998, the San Francisco Chronicle requested the forms that government
contractors file with the U.S. Department of Labor, and confirmed what everyone knew. 
Staff at thirty-three of the most prominent firms in the Valley are, on average, about 4
percent African-American and 7 percent Latino, even though African-Americans and
Latinos make up 8 percent and 14 percent respectively of the Bay Area labor force.   41
Silicon Valley's high-tech labor force was also about 4 percent African-American
in 1980.  Those Blacks were disproportionately in production work, lost jobs along with
others in the industry recession in the mid-1980s, and were one-third less likely to be
rehired than whites, Hispanics, or Asians.   Managers hiring for unskilled assembly jobs42
interviewed from 1989 to 1993 were quite open in their preference for Asians over
Latinos, Latinas, and African-Americans.   Four government contractors were fined by43
the Department of Labor in the 1990s for denying a job to a qualified applicant rejected
on racial grounds: Apple, Oracle, Solectron, and Everex Systems.  Low numbers of these
groups in technical and scientific positions are normally attributed today to low numbers
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of African-Americans and Latinos/as studying math or science and poor networks of
recruiting, since so few people from those groups work in the industry now.  44
The story sparked some interest in the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, specifically in Vice-Chair Paul Igasaki, who encouraged its office in San
Jose to focus on the technology industry.    The only reported result of this effort was a45
relatively small ($50,000) settlement at Acropolis Systems, Inc., of Milpitas, to a fired
African-American human resources manager and two others.  She claimed she was fired
for refusing to "do something" about "too many blacks in the office."  The company
denied wrongdoing and disputed the incident but claimed to want to avoid the expense of
further litigation.   Of course, that's what companies always say, but if the case settled46
for $50,000, the EEOC must have doubted that it could prove the allegation.
 D. Age Discrimination
There are many anecdotes of middle-aged technical workers who had difficulty
finding jobs in information technology even in the tight labor markets of the last few
years of the 1990s.   To quote a U.S. Department of Commerce study (not limited to47
Silicon Valley): "The IT industry is populated by many younger workers.  Approximately
75 percent of computer systems analysts and scientists, and nearly 80 percent of
computer programmers are under the age of 45.  Many managers in the IT industry are in
their 20s and 30s, and may be uncomfortable hiring or managing older and more
experienced workers.  A Network World survey of 200 readers with some hiring
responsibility showed that younger network managers are less likely to hire older
workers than younger workers.  Almost half of respondents 20 to 30 years of age had
never hired a person over the age of 40."48
It is hard to know what to make of surveys like this.    For example, it is easy to49
find letters to computer magazines by older IT professionals claiming discrimination. 
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One invented a resume of himself, fifteen years younger, in order to get interviews.  It
didn't make much difference.  50
 The National Research Council was skeptical of any claims of systematic age
discrimination.   An analysis by Professor Henry Farber, of national data on information51
technology workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, showed little systematic
difference between workers over forty and younger workers.  The entire IT workforce is
younger than workforces of similar educational attainment.   Information technology
workers over forty are more likely to lose jobs than younger workers.   (The reverse is
normally true).  However, they were (during the years of the study) just as likely to find
new jobs as younger workers, in similar amounts of time.  Within three years of job loss,
82% of the above-40 group, and 84% of the under-40 group, found new jobs.   The new
jobs were comparable.  In particular, the older workers’ were not more likely to be part-
time, or outside information technology, than the younger workers’.   The older workers
may take a larger pay cut, even accounting for the fact that they were paid more than
younger workers at the time of job loss.  Farber was unable to determine why older IT
workers are more likely to lose their jobs.  The reasons conventionally given are
employer preference for newer programming languages, other hot job skills, and cost
factors.  Even if there is some illegal discrimination occurring against IT workers over
40, ending it “would not have a significant impact on tightness in the IT workforce in the
long term.”52
Since 2000, half the Californians working in the technology sector have left the
field, often taking jobs outside the technology sector that pay less.    This study,53
however, does not distinguish among workers so does not permit comparison of older
and younger workers. 
A related interpretive problem, in my view, is that we lack any longitudinal
studies of the career of computer programmers or other computer professionals. 
Computer programming, in particular, is in many ways not a particularly good job, and it
is perhaps not  surprising that few people do it all their lives.  As Peter Cappelli observes:
"In brief, aside from pay, many IT jobs--but especially computer programming jobs--
would qualify as lousy work.  Most of the understanding about how to design work to
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meet the psychological needs of workers seems to have bypassed the IT professions."  54
Programming tasks are divided into small jobs; programmers work in isolation from each
other and from the organization; work under considerable time pressure and receive little
recognition.    So it may not be surprising that one sees so few programmers (in55
particular) over 40.  A National Science Foundation analysis of Census data shows that,
"six years after finishing college, 57 percent of computer science graduates are working
as programmers; at 15 year the figure drops to 34 percent, and at 20 years--when most
are still in their early 40's--it is down to 19 percent.  In contrast, the figures for civil
engineering are 61 percent, 52 percent and 52 percent."56
The question is: what happens to them?  It is at this point that very well-informed
observers of the Silicon Valley labor market (for example, professors at Stanford
Graduate School of Business) typically tell me a story about somebody whose kid played
soccer on their kid's team.  Some proportion of those who wrote code in the 1980s are
now working elsewhere in IT firms, working for venture capital firms, teaching at
community colleges, practicing law, or selling real estate in Oregon.  Some founded their
own companies, so are no longer in the employment statistics as employees at all, but are
self-employed.  Some are happy with how life turned out, some aren't, but nobody has
any systematic picture.  Few were unemployed in 2000, when unemployment rates in the
Valley were below two percent.  But, as Norman Matloff, who argues strongly that there
is age discrimination, observes: "A programmer who becomes, say, an insurance agent
after failing to find programming work counts in the statistics as an employed insurance
seller, not an unemployed software worker." 57
The case that systematic age discrimination is taking place may be another of
those assertions that presupposes the old world of internal labor markets that Silicon
Valley has largely left behind.  In an internal labor market, thin representation of workers
in their 40s often suggests age discrimination, breach of implicit promises, or both.  In a
high-velocity labor market, no such inference follows.  What appears as age
discrimination may be a different phenomenon: demand for very specific skill sets at
hiring, as a way of reducing information costs as firms constantly search for the best
workers in a situation in which information of any kind is thin and unreliable.  Firms will
hire only programmers who can program in Java already.  They will not train or retrain
programmers they've worked with before, and do not value experience in older
programming languages.  Most published complaints about "age discrimination" go on to
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include just this charge.   I'll look more closely at this demand in the section that58
follows, and in Part III of this chapter consider whether it might represent discrimination
in a legal sense.
Still, even if systematic age discrimination is difficult to prove, there are
undoubtedly individual cases of age discrimination in high technology.  There are even
journalistic anecdotes in which employers actually display prejudicial stereotypes about
older workers, what lawyers call "direct evidence" of discrimination.   It is all the more59
surprising, then, that there appear to be no reported or unreported cases of age
discrimination against high tech firms in the Valley, apart from the occasional individual
executive's suit for stock options.  I'll discuss why in Part IV.
II. Why Divergent Labor Market Outcomes by Race and Ethnicity?
In the classical economic account of discrimination, individual employers may
indulge a taste for discrimination.   Such discrimination is economically subrational, but60
has little economic effect.  It merely creates a labor market opportunity for another
employer.  More recent scholarship on disparate labor market outcomes has criticized the
classical account and substituted a highly nuanced understanding of modern
discrimination.   In these accounts, the natural habitat of discrimination is the large firm61
with internal job tournaments, and discrimination reflects a combination of unconscious
racism, subjective hiring criteria, failures to mentor, high information costs of learning
about employees, and inefficient signaling.
The disparate labor market outcomes by race in Silicon Valley do not reflect
either the classical account ("taste for discrimination") or the tournament account.    I do
not believe there is much taste for discrimination, and certainly no taste for association
with whites as such (given the success of Asians).   Disparate labor market outcomes do
not reflect internal tournaments or promotion ladders, which are weak.   Failures to62
mentor are a  factor, certainly for women, yet mentoring is haphazard at best and also not
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extended proportionately to Asians.   Nor are hiring criteria excessively subjective.  The63
usual charge is that they are excessively specific.64
Rather, disparate labor market outcomes in Silicon Valley are the very result of
the distinctive features of employment in the Valley: short tenures, rapid turnover,
cooperation among networked firms, start-ups and self-employment as career options
built into the reward structure, and flexible compensation.   I have argued that these
aspects of working in Silicon Valley are responsible for a good portion of its remarkable
technological and economic growth.   This chapter shows that these features can result65
in labor markets with strong racial disparities.
Rapid turnover creates a constant need to hire, despite generally low levels of
information about individual applicants. Three employer responses, each individually
rational, reduce information costs but create racially disparate outcomes.  First,
employers require very specific skill sets at hiring and are not willing to train or retrain
employees who lack those skills.   This has particularly negative impact on older,
African-American, and Latino/a employees.  Second, employers rely heavily on contacts,
connections, and hiring entire teams.  Social and business contacts continue to be
segregated and thus reinforce disparate labor market outcomes.  Third, low rates of
entrepreneurial activity among African-Americans have direct labor market
consequences.  
In a classical labor market like Gary Becker’s, racial discrimination by an
individual employer may be subrational but merely creates an opportunity for another
employer so has limited systemic effects.   By contrast, in a high-velocity labor market66
or similar network, racial discrimination by an individual employer is not irrational and
does not create labor market opportunities for another employer. Instead, as Kenneth
Arrow observes, in a network, there are rewards to discrimination, and no costs.  67
A. Introduction: Job Searches, for Top Employees,  Without Tournaments
In a high-velocity labor market like Silicon Valley’s, where people tend to stay on
the job for eighteen months or so, employers hire all the time, often with little
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information.   Constant hiring spreads information among firms,  and creates a need for68 69
novel labor market intermediaries.    Let's look more closely at how this works in the70
market for programmers, who have been frequently discussed in the popular and
academic literature.  Programmers are the most common example in discussions of age
discrimination and probably illustrate racial disparities as well as any other occupational
group.
Discussions of computer programmers often observe that the best are vastly
superior to the mean, more productive by a factor of twenty or so.    Whether this is true71
or not, employers act as if it is true.  They devote enormous time and energy to
identifying superior workers.72
Older companies used to identify good employees through a slow method that
economists call a “job tournament.”      In these models, employers don't worry much73
about the job skills that they can't observe at hiring anyway.  They hire a bunch of people
who look pretty good and then offer them incentives if they perform really well.   Some
won't make it and will get washed out as probationary employees; some look better and
may get trained by the employer; some will ascend to the top of the heap.  The
partnership or fat salary is the price the employer pays in order to induce the entering
employee to work as hard as possible.  In the interesting variant by Charny and Gulati,
the employer will be able to distinguish a small group of superstars (and hire them), but
will be relatively indifferent to which subset of a mass of fairly standard applicants are
hired.  Charny and Gulati show how such tournaments may result in racially disparate
outcomes.  74
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Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard, discussed supra n.13, illustrates the traditional focus of78
discrimination law on evaluation criteria that are too subjective, as opposed to too specific.
The tournament device is not available to a typical Silicon Valley start-up (or
even established firm).  Where job tenures average eighteen months, the employer
obviously cannot promise a long career ladder, backload benefits, or even maintain long
probationary periods.  Instead, employers try to find excellent employees at the hiring
stage.  Matloff  interviewed a number of prominent information technology employers in
1997 and 1999, that is, during the years they complained of "desperate shortages."  They
were nevertheless extremely picky.    All employers admitted being flooded with
resumes, and nevertheless hiring no more than a maximum of 5 percent of applicants
(Cisco).   Many companies hired fewer than 1 percent.   The devices employed to do so75
contribute, as we now see, to racially disparate outcomes.
 B. Demand for specific skills at hiring
Employers in high-velocity labor markets are less likely than older employers to
search for generalists with multiple aptitudes--the kind of engineer or lawyer who would
be the best contributor to a firm over a forty-year career.  Instead, jobs are defined to
include highly particular skill sets, and actual experience in using them.  During the
period of my research, programmers had to be able to program in Java.  Matloff cites job
advertisements like "Must have experience writing C++ code for TCP/IP applications on
SPARC platforms."   This pickiness did not simply reflect a generally tight labor market. 76
It is an inherent feature of high-velocity labor markets.  Indeed, in 2002, despite the
elimination of half a million jobs in information technology nationally, employers
continued to search for database administrators, web architects, and others–and they
looked for very specific skills.77
To employers, these specific skill requirements refute any implication of bias or
discrimination, the kind of discrimination that would, by contrast, creep in if employers
were looking for someone to "fit into firm culture" or "make partner" someday.  "If we
find someone who programs fast in Java, we will hire them today," I was told dozens of
times, "whatever they look like or whatever planet they come from."  The success of
programmers from Asia is supposed to demonstrate the lack of discrimination that results
when jobs are tightly defined by objective, job-related performance criteria.   
Such jobs do look like the Holy Grail to human resources professionals and
lawyers, accustomed to identifying discrimination either with intentional hostility, or job
requirements unrelated to performance yet with disparate racial impact.   If African-78
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Americans are not hired as programmers and engineers--and they are not--this simply
reflects their lack of skills, or human capital, and not discrimination.  79
Matters are not so simple, however, for specific required skill sets may be an
instrument generating discriminatory outcomes, even if not necessarily illegal
discrimination.  First, obviously, they take the education system and labor market as they
find them.  If African-Americans don't learn Java somewhere else, that's not the
companies' problem.  What if companies are the most efficient trainers in Java, and no
other institution even offers such training in the Valley?  A democratic society can't
conscript employers to train employees.  It could offer incentives to encourage
conversion of a high-velocity labor market into one of more stable employment: by
taxing separations, limiting flexibility, enforcing covenants not to compete--but these risk
harming the very scientific and economic vitality of the district.  Possibly the
unwillingness of companies to train employees creates a market opportunity for a labor
market intermediary to train, certify, and place employees, whether a proprietary school,
community college, or employee organization like the Working Partnerships project of
the South Bay Labor Council.   Second, a job requirement such as "ability to program in80
Java" (or some other hot language) will clearly favor younger programmers over older. 
I'll return to these points in Part III, when I analyze whether either of these disparate
outcomes violates Civil Rights laws.  
  C.   Connection Networks 
One of the most attractively meritocratic aspects of Silicon Valley's labor market
are the stories of young people arriving from distant places, knowing nobody, and
succeeding in establishing reputations based entirely on their competence.   This is no81
myth.  On the other hand, there is no reason to think that employer openness to unknown
job candidates is the whole story, or functions in a racially-neutral manner.   Kenneth
Arrow and Ron Borzekowski model compensation generally as a function of employee
contacts in networks: the more contacts, the greater the compensation.   Whether or not82
this is true for the economy as a whole, interviews certainly demonstrate the importance
of network contacts in a high-velocity labor market.  The growth of temporary help and
other recruiting firms reflects the fact that personal contacts become more, not less,
important in the age of internet job boards and employer access to thousands of
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resumes.   Hiring may often reflect contacts from past work assignments, though in83
today’s Silicon Valley rarely social contacts.   Hiring often involves entire teams.  Phil84
Schneidermeyer, managing director of Advanced Technology Practice at the search firm
Korn/Ferry International: “You go out to look for one, but your expectation is that
whomever you hire will bring in five to eight other members of his or her previous
team.”    85
 
We know essentially nothing systematic about how different groups protected by
discrimination laws make use of networks of contacts.  Some assumptions are plausible. 
Older workers should be advantaged over younger workers in markets in which personal
contacts are important.  Ethnic ties to workers already in the industry probably reinforce
the likelihood of being hired.   As mentioned, firms with the highest percentage of
women employees are those that rely most heavily on recruiting those personally known
to founders.   Once inside the firm, a large California high technology-engineering firm,86
networks were closely associated with mobility but did not function differently for non-
whites and women, though both groups were lightly represented in the sample.87
D. Entrepreneurial Preference
In the entrepreneurial version of the American success story, the successful
founder often prefers members of his own ethnic group.  It is not possible to break down
Silicon Valley workforce statistics by the ethnicity of the firm founder.  The difference
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may not be great.  All Valley employers employ lots of Asians, and none employs many
African-Americans. 
 
Still, if Valley employers are just like America here, it adds up to another strike
against African-Americans.  African Americans are less than one-third as likely as white
Americans to be self-employed, a ratio that has been constant for many years.    Rates of88
entrepreneurship by ethnic group are almost perfectly negatively correlated with
unemployment rates for that group, suggesting a strong tendency for entrepreneurs to
prefer their own kind.    To illustrate how this works in the “meritocracy” of Silicon89
Valley, a survey of several thousand Chinese and Indian engineers active in formal
associations found that they were most likely to be employed in a firm that has at least
two founders from their country of birth.  Almost 60 percent of Indian engineers, and
54.5% of engineers born in the People's Republic of China, work for firms in which more
than ten percent of the workforce shares this characteristic.  90
Obviously future research, and even journalism, will contribute much to our
understanding of how disparate outcomes are generated in meritocratic, high-velocity
labor markets.  For the rest of the chapter, though, let's assume the following stylized
portrait of discrimination in high-velocity labor markets.  Firms hire constantly for the
relatively short-term.  They demand experience in narrowly-defined skill sets,  and rely on
intermediaries that can credibly confirm individuals' skills.  They derive no particular
benefit from workplace diversity as such, given short tenures and high turnover.  Hiring
personnel have no particular objection to employees of different ethnicity, but no
incentive whatever to go find them.  
Under these conditions, getting a job depends mainly on ability to acquire hot
skills, connections to individuals at other firms, and rates of entrepreneurial activity
among one's own ethnic group.  Recent graduates of technical institutes, even foreign, will
do well.   Older workers should have good network connections, but if they lack
entrepreneurial aptitude--that is, if they have not already started their own firm-- they will
face constant pressure to update skills.  African-Americans will do particularly poorly:
their schools will disproportionately prepare them poorly in mathematics and science;
they will find few African-Americans inside companies; and even fewer owning them.
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III.  Are Silicon Valley employers violating civil rights laws?
If a Home Depot store has very few women in high-paying sales or managerial
jobs, as used to be common, it can expect to be sued under the discrimination laws, as also
used to be extremely common.   In 1997, Home Depot settled multiple discrimination91
suits for $104.5 million, eventually making major changes in its personnel processes.  92
Are large Silicon Valley employers with poor records of employing African-Americans or
Latinos/as or people older than forty, similarly vulnerable?   The difficulties in analysis
show some of the problems involved in mapping our existing law of employment
discrimination onto high-velocity labor markets.
A. Stable career jobs as the natural habitat of employment discrimination law
I have shown elsewhere how the law of trade secrets and employee organization
reflects an assumption of stable long-term careers inside individual firms.   It may93
surprise readers that the law of employment discrimination makes the same assumption. 
If asked to name an employment practice forbidden by the civil rights laws, I suppose
most people would name the refusal to hire someone because of that individual's race,
color, sex, or religion.  While such a refusal does indeed violate the Civil Rights Act, in
practice there are very few lawsuits growing out of refusals to hire.  Rather, the natural
habitat of the law of employment discrimination is the discharge, or failure to promote.  94
In these two situations, the law normally assumes stable employment, that would have
continued had it not been disrupted by an act of discrimination.
Refusal-to-hire cases are almost impossible to prove.    There is rarely a
presumption that any individual will be hired for any particular job, and individuals rarely
are told, or find out independently, why they did not get any particular job.  Employers are
not normally required to keep records of job applications, and few do.  Finally, such suits
are rarely worth an attorney's time.  Until the statute was amended in 1991, remedies were
limited to compensatory damages.  If someone doesn't get a job because of discrimination,
but gets a different job instead that pays about what the old one did, there may have been
discrimination but there is no legal damage.  Since 1991, punitive damages are
theoretically possible, but again almost impossible to establish in hiring cases.
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By contrast, loss of a stable job, well into the employment life-cycle, is worth
fighting over.  The same is true if the employer signals that the employee will not proceed
further up a promotion ladder.    Damages may well be substantial, as the employee's
earnings may exceed significantly his or her opportunity wage.  Something will have been
said about the discharge or failure to promote, and that statement may turn out to be
evidence of discrimination, if either direct evidence of prejudice, or pretextual. 
Comparison will be possible between the potential plaintiff and other employees. 
Particular hiring practices, such as subjective criteria, might turn out statistically to have
disparate impacts across protected groups.
B. Applying discrimination law to a high-velocity labor market
1. General problems
There is thus little case law, and little academic literature, on applying
discrimination law to labor markets in which hiring is constant, job tenures are short,
internal labor markets weak, and racial disparities appear at the hiring stage.    (By
contrast, the literature on discrimination in internal labor markets, identified with
tournaments, patterns of mentoring, subjective criteria, and inefficient signaling, is quite
sophisticated).   The problems in proving discrimination are severe.  Some have already95
been suggested.  
First, discrimination that occurs at the hiring stage is difficult to document.
Second, many plaintiffs who are in fact victims of discrimination will not bother to sue if
other jobs are available.  It is obviously a good thing if jobs are available and
unemployment is low.  I am not suggesting these things should be changed for the sake of
developing antidiscrimination law.  Rather, I am just reinforcing the point that the natural
habitat of antidiscrimination law is the lucrative late-career job up the career ladder.  
Third, the highly flexible forms of acquiring labor bedevil statistical analysis and
thus make discrimination difficult to prove.   For example, programmers (like just about
any other business service in the Valley) may be obtained by hiring an employee;
subcontracting to a self-employed individual, unincorporated business, or incorporated
business, inside or outside the US; or hiring a temporary employee referred (and
nominally employed) by an agency, or an immigrant on a temporary visa.   Collecting96
and presenting the relevant statistical evidence, on all these modes of acquiring
programming services, is obviously far more complex than comparing the resumes of all
the accountants or legal associates to see which made partner and which did not.  Civil
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rights laws forbid discrimination in "employment," but not, as a general matter,
discrimination in contracting for business services.97
Fourth, and, I believe, most important, disparate outcomes are, as shown above, 
generated largely through the practices of demand for skills and experience at hiring,
skewed sources of information in networks, and skewed distribution of business
ownership.  The demand for skills and experience at the time of hiring is just the sort of
thing often proposed as an antidote to the discrimination generated by subjective hiring
criteria, yet it, too, may generate disparate outcomes, particularly by age and ethnicity. 
Yet it is difficult to imagine a successful challenge under the discrimination laws to a
hiring criterion for being too specific.  This will require some legal discussion.
2. The problem of demands for specific skills and experience at hiring
In some circumstances, disparate treatment, violating the Civil Rights Act, can be
proved simply statistically, where a protected group is underrepresented in a workforce at
a rate that is two standard deviations away from a predicted normal representation.     98
The very low percentages of African Americans in Silicon Valley firms may suggest
exploration of these theories.    Such statistical proof is relevant under two slightly
different legal approaches that are often confused with each other: "statistical proof of
disparate treatment" and "disparate impact."  In the Hazelwood School District case,
involving a suburban school district with very few nonwhite teachers, the Supreme Court
stated that a distribution two standard deviations away from normal distribution might
alone constitute proof of disparate treatment.  However, on the facts of that case, the low
numbers of African-American teachers hired triggered instead an obligation in the
employer to explain what was going on.  For example, the Court held, the school district
might show recent improvement in its hiring, or dispute the definition of the relevant labor
market.
Proving disparate treatment (called, since 1991, "intentional” discrimination)99
solely through statistical evidence might appear an attractive option to plaintiffs' lawyers. 
In fact, however, lawyers prefer not to make much use of this theory.  An unsuccessful
suit against Sears by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the 1970s
relied almost exclusively on statistical proof of gendered patterns in job assignments,
women rarely being assigned to the more remunerative commission sales.  The courts
were unimpressed with the statistics, imagining that women might not have been
interested in the better jobs.     The plaintiffs' bar learned the lesson that no statistics are100
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good enough by themselves.  One must present vivid anecdotes of individual
discrimination.
The procedure is similar but not identical where plaintiffs allege that a particular
hiring practice has a "disparate impact," a judicially-created interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act, added in terms to the statute in 1991.    Plaintiff identifies a particular101
employment practice with a disparate impact on different groups, and then the employer
explains what is going on.  The difference is that the employer has an additional defense
to a "disparate impact" case.  In such a case, the employer is permitted to show that the
facially neutral employment practice, producing the disparate impact, is "job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity."   By contrast, "business102
necessity" is not a defense where the plaintiff has demonstrated "intentional
discrimination," that is, disparate treatment.
A hypothetical suit alleging race or age discrimination by a Silicon Valley
employer might scrutinize the practice of highly-specific job qualifications under both
lenses.  It's not clear that the difference would be important.  Plaintiffs could easily show
the low representation of (say) African-American programmers or engineers, and the role
of specific qualifications (e.g. experience in programming in C++ of TCI/IP applications
on SPARC platforms...) in generating disparate outcomes.   Employers, however, could
probably defend the practice.  To the charge that such skill requirements have a "disparate
impact," employers would argue that they are justified by "business necessity."  As
mentioned, there is room for debate here.  Advocates insist that good programmers trained
in older languages can adapt to newer problems.    However, it is difficult to imagine a103
court substituting its judgment for the employer's on an issue like that.  104
The employer could also probably defend its skills requirement against a
"disparate treatment" charge, to which "business necessity" is not a defense.  The issue
here would involve the definition of the labor market.  Defining the relevant labor market
was one of the issues that the Supreme Court refused to decide in the school teacher case. 
Since few cases have used the theory, there remains much uncertainty about how to define
labor markets.  Surely a high-tech employer will successfully argue that the standard is not
the total number of African-Americans (for example) in the Bay Area labor market.  But
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is the standard the market for programmers, or Java programmers, or Java programmers
with experience on highly specific applications?  
The answer doesn't much matter for the African-Americans.  Nobody believes
there are enough African-American programmers in any of these labor markets to
establish deviation from an ideal distribution.  (Advancing African-Americans would
require attention to exclusion from other, less technical positions; from networks of
information; and from educational opportunity.  I'll take these up below).
However, the definition of labor market would be critical to a suit by older
programmers alleging intentional age discrimination and relying on statistical proof.  
Suppose the employer hires only programmers with actual Java experience and also hires
no programmers over 40.  If the relevant employment pool is “programmers in the Bay
area,” the employer’s zero will be evidence, perhaps proof, of intentional discrimination. 
The employer will surely argue however that its distribution of older programmers must
be measured instead against the ideal distribution in the market for programmers with
Java experience.  If there are any programmers in the Bay area over 40 with Java
experience, the employer who hires none will fall short of the statistically ideal
distribution.   However, if the pool is defined, or redefined, the employer, though short of
the ideal, may no longer deviate from it by two standard deviations.   The "business
necessity" defense, supposedly irrelevant in cases of intentional discrimination, will come
back as part of defining the labor market.  There must be some limit to this argument, but
it will take much litigation to learn what it is.
So it is difficult to imagine a successful case demonstrating discrimination in
hiring programmers based on statistical proof.  Ironic confirmation of this statement
comes in a recent publication suggesting the widespread presence of intentional
discrimination, statistically proven, in the US workforce, and advocating greater use by
plaintiffs’ lawyers of the theory.     In this study, discrimination is established by105
comparing a particular employer’s employment statistics with other employers in its
industry.  If a given industry employs a workforce that is fifteen or twenty percent
African-American, a particular employer that employs only two or three percent may well
have some explaining to do.  Using this test, it is impossible to establish discrimination in
the computer or software industry.  So few African-Americans or Latinos work in the
industry that no individual employer deviates much from its normal distribution.106
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Statistical proof might be more useful in demonstrating intentional discrimination
for positions without such rigorous entry requirements.  It is indeed difficult to explain
why Intel's office clericals are only 4 percent African-American.107
3. The problem of exclusion from information networks
It is not surprising that employers who hire all the time, and cannot observe job
performance, will rely heavily on networks: hiring an individual in the expectation that he
will bring a team with him; hiring individuals known to current employees from past
work.  Networks are efficient solutions to high information costs, even though they will
magnify racial and ethnic disparities existing at the time of labor market entry (and thus
reduce incentives in excluded groups ever to enter that labor market).  
Still, this kind of racially disparate outcome would seem to be a much easier legal
case than disparate outcomes resulting from requiring specific skill sets at hiring. 
Recruiting through particular contacts may be efficient, but if it has a disparate impact, it
is unlikely to be justified by business necessity--not in a world in which internet job
boards and job sites make thousands of resumes available.  If exclusion from networks
reflected only the fact that it's quicker and easier to hire your friends and your friends'
friends, law could correct this problem, particularly as to those Valley employers who are
government contractors subject to affirmative action requirements.  
Silicon Valley employers therefore balance, delicately, the convenience of hiring
through referral networks with their genuine commitment to nondiscrimination, as they
understand it.  Even the lowest ranks of the industry, the manufacturing jobs, are
considerably more diverse by ethnicity and gender today than ten or twenty years ago,
when one normally observed white men supervising "short, brown, foreign" women.  108
They too now share an express ethos of nondiscrimination.  Chun worked at a contract
manufacturer in the summer of 1997.  She observed her supervisor, a man of Vietnamese
origin, simultaneously encourage workers to let him know if they had a friend or cousin
who needed a job, and then tell a story about having to fire a Vietnamese speaker.  "On
the line, you hear me speak Vietnamese to other workers.  Some people think I favor them
if you speak my language.  They think I give better treatment.  But, he speaks my
language.  I still let him go....It doesn't matter if you speak my language or if you don't.  I
treat everyone equally."109
If a workforce is already unbalanced ethnically yet recruits largely or entirely by
word of mouth, it will not hire workers from groups not already represented.  Is this illegal
discrimination?  The answer is somewhat unclear.  Judge Posner once decided a case of a
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janitorial firm owned by a Korean immigrant with an overwhelmingly Korean workforce. 
It hired employees strictly on referral from current employees and received few if any
serious applications from non-Koreans.  Posner held that this was not intentional
discrimination.  Rather, it was the cheapest method of recruitment, resulted in the best
information about job applicants and some screening of them.   However, in that case,110
there was no claim that employee referral constituted discrimination because of its
"disparate impact."  
Since the events giving rise to that decision, the law of "disparate impact" has been
made somewhat more pro-plaintiff by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  Today, an employer
that relied exclusively on employee referral would be challenged because of its disparate
impact on groups not previously represented in the workforce.  It could defend exclusive
reliance on employee referral only on a showing that the practice was a business necessity. 
It's not clear how this "business necessity" defense would apply to low-tech jobs like the
Korean janitorial firm before Judge Posner, or the thirty percent of Taiwanese Chinese-
owned computer distributors in Los Angeles County that lack any non-Chinese
employees.  (Does "business necessity" simply mean the cheapest and most efficient111
way of proceeding, or something without which the business would fail?)  However, high-
tech employers could hardly show any kind of business necessity for relying solely on
employee referral to fill high-tech positions, since internet job boards make thousands of
resumes available for high-tech positions.  Moreover, Posner's opinion was not applied in
a later case, when an employer actually received applications from African-Americans,
and still did not hire any.  This turned reliance on employee referrals into illegal
intentional discrimination.    However, few Silicon Valley employers receive many112
applications from African-Americans.
So, in theory, the kind of heavy reliance that some Silicon Valley employers place
on referrals by current employees--a practice that helps to generate racially disparate
outcomes--might constitute unlawful discrimination because of its disparate impact.    
This conclusions seems somewhat pedantic, however.  My reading of the cases--and
conversations with lawyers--suggest that such a claim would not be brought without
additional strong anecdotal evidence of qualified African-American applicants who
actually applied but were turned down. 
4. The weak claim of "diversity".
Workforces like Silicon Valley's, with low representation of African-Americans
and Latinos/as, raise the question of how strong is the legal system's commitment to
"diversity" as such.  Suppose I am correct that the low representation of these groups
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primarily reflects employers' demand for high skills on hiring, and unequal access to
information and entrepreneurial networks.  A strong advocate of workplace "diversity"
might claim this misses the point.  Such firms would benefit, it might be said, from a more
diverse workforce, and thus should be required to recruit one.
The evidence on the advantages of "diversity" as such is not that strong, even as to
large and general workplaces.  Perhaps there is a case for requiring ethnic and racial
diversity in newsrooms or elementary schools.  However, I do not know of any literature
looking specifically at diversity in highly technical or scientific work teams.  It is hard to
imagine that diversity as such would contribute anything at all to a technical project.  It is
difficult to describe any advantage, to the employer putting together a project on wireless
data networks (for example), employing a few dozen engineers, programmers, and
managers for a defined period and then likely to be spun off or sold, in diversity as such. 
By contrast, it is easy to see some potential advantages in an entire team from India or
Taiwan, for example if the business plan is for the team to operate for a time in California,
then relocate to another country.
For a generation or more, our discourse of workplace equity, fairness, or justice
has given way to a discourse of diversity.  It may be doubted that diversity as such could
ever have borne the weight placed on it.  For this chapter, however, we need only note that
the case for opening more jobs in Silicon Valley to excluded groups must rest on
arguments of equity or justice, or private or public gain, but not on diversity as such.
5. Existing discrimination law targets employers, not networks
 Our existing law of discrimination, like our law of employee organization, locates
the relevant employee community within the boundaries of a single employer.  The
discriminating unit is the single employer.  (As mentioned, statistical proofs of
discrimination single out individual employers who are deviant in their industries, not
entire networks of discrimination).   Remedies for discrimination, if found, will similarly113
fall on particular employers, who might be ordered to promote particular individuals, or
modify particular practices with discriminatory impact.
 Much of this apparatus assumes the internal labor markets and promotion ladders
of an earlier era.  The EEOC, or counsel to the private plaintiff, asks the employer: “Are
there any female vice-presidents?   Do any African-Americans serve in this agency above
GS-14?”    We do not know what questions to ask of an employer with flat managerial
hierarchies, twenty-five or thirty percent turnover a year, where a quarter or so of the
people working on any day are either self-employed consultants or employees of a
temporary help agency, where no one expects to make a lifetime career, where successful
careers inevitably involve changes among employers, stints as a self-employed consultant,
and ultimately founding one’s own company.  
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Obviously there will be no cases alleging discriminatory failure to promote or
discharge.  Even discriminatory failure-to-hire cases may have difficulties in defining
what it means to “hire.”  These ambiguities would be tolerable if Silicon Valley’s high-
velocity labor market were delivering employment equity, in some rough and ready
fashion.  But it is not, and so our intellectual failure to define equal employment in terms
of today’s jobs becomes a serious one.
.
 I had thought that in talking to plaintiff’s lawyers, I would learn of potential
discrimination suits against Silicon Valley employers that foundered on definitional and
statistical questions of this kind.  This turned out not to be true.  Instead, there has never
been a systematic discrimination suit against a Silicon Valley employer.  The problems in
this section remain, however.  They may lie a few years in the future.  They may never
arise, if discrimination suits become irrelevant in tomorrow’s labor markets.  I think,
however, a time will come when we will want our law of discrimination to come to grips
with careers that do not take place entirely within the boundaries of a single firm.
6. Conclusions on the existence of illegal discrimination
The low representation of older workers, African-Americans, and Latinos/as in
Silicon Valley most probably represents a combination of legal and illegal discrimination. 
The numbers are so low as to trigger some burden on employers to justify them. 
Employers could, however, probably justify the highly-specific skill sets required, despite
their exclusory effects.  Only against a background assumption of old-style internal labor
markets, in which firms employ for entire careers and expect to train, do these skill
requirements appear suspicious.  I have argued throughout this book that courts should not
impose the picture of internal labor markets on high-velocity labor markets, and I must
maintain that position despite my sympathy for those excluded.  So I think that a general
preference for specific skill sets, and refusal to train, do not violate the Civil Rights laws
even where the effect is to exclude older, African-American, and Latino/a employees and
result in workforces that are almost entirely white and Asian.
Illegal discrimination, however, probably occurs when employers act on
prejudicial stereotypes, or recruit solely through networks known to them.  The
stereotyping particularly harms older workers, while the networks particularly exclude
African-American and Latino/a workers, particularly from less-skilled jobs.  Both kinds of
cases are difficult to win in practice.  A stereotyping case normally requires direct
evidence of the prejudice.  Such prejudice against old people is sometimes expressed.  A
case of "hiring through referral" normally requires showing actual application by, and
rejection of, qualified members of excluded minority groups.   Journalism suggests that
both scenarios are found in Silicon Valley.
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IV.  Why are there no reported legal cases finding, or even alleging, discrimination in
Silicon Valley?
So the question is raised of why there are no reported or unreported cases
challenging systemic exclusion of older workers, or African-Americans, or Latinos/as,
from the Silicon Valley job market.  
Reported cases are of course useless for social science purposes; they are not a
representative sample of any social practice, including litigation, and not accurate
accounts even of the facts in the reported case.     Reported employment discrimination114
cases are even less representative of  employment discrimination cases than other reported
cases are of their class.  Lawyers who practice in the area confirm that the "best" cases
from plaintiffs' point of view nearly always settle, and the price of the settlement is a
confidentiality order--for which defendant was willing to pay quite a bit-- that forbids
counsel or the parties from discussing the case.  So I was not surprised to discover no
officially-reported cases finding a high-tech employer in Silicon Valley guilty of
discrimination.   I fully expected to interview lawyers, and to that end interviewed
numerous lawyers who represent either plaintiffs or defendants (occasionally some of
each) in employment litigation.
As nearly as I can determine, there has never been a case attacking any Silicon
Valley employment practice as a systemic exclusion of, or discrimination against, older,
or African-American, or Latino/a, or female, employees.  The absence of age
discrimination is particularly striking.  There is a handful of unreported cases, all
involving highly individual claims, such as an individual woman sexually harassed by a
particular supervisor, or a discharged Oracle executive suing for stock options who adds a
discrimination count to a breach of contract claim.  Yet nearly everyone believes that there
are employers that do systematically discriminate against older workers, and the statistics
on African-Americans and Latinos/as would prompt litigation in other industries.  Why
not here?
At least three explanations have been suggested to me, but I think we can reject
two of them.  (1) There is no shortage of capable lawyers who represent plaintiffs in
discrimination suits.  (2) California law is not unfavorable to discrimination plaintiffs (as
it is to trade secrets plaintiffs); if anything, it is more favorable to plaintiffs.  In my
judgment, the absence of successful discrimination suits in Silicon Valley, even against
stereotyping and exclusion from referral networks, reflects: (3) the availability until
recently of alternative, even preferable, employment for victims of discrimination, and the
costs of suing.  
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A. The plaintiffs' lawyers?
There is no shortage of lawyers in the Bay area, and no shortage of lawyers willing
to take a discrimination case on behalf of a plaintiff.  The lawyers are not in bed with, or
in any way dependent on, the large Valley employers.  
I found plaintiffs' lawyers by tracing lawyers involved in cases mentioned in news
articles, and by referral from other lawyers in the area.   Many resemble the lawyers
drawn into employment discrimination practice after the 1991 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act created jury trials and increased damages.  My generalizations about these
lawyers are commonplace in the field, though lack comprehensive academic treatment. 
They approach discrimination litigation like personal injury litigation.  They
conceptualize discrimination as a bad event that happens to an individual, like a car
accident or defective product.  They are compensated from contingent fees, so have
incentives to put their energies into cases that offer the possibility of really large jury
verdicts.  In the employment discrimination field, such a case involves: a sympathetic
plaintiff, subject to an affront that is easy to explain and comprehend, that caused her to
leave or be fired from a well-paid job, leaving her with substantial documentable losses
(such as doctor bills), and out of well-paid work for a substantial period.  An incident, or
course of incidents, of sexual harassment, or age discrimination, fills the bill well.  By
contrast, there will be little incentive to take cases for people who didn't get hired in the
first place (discrimination hard to prove); people who didn't get one job but got another
(no damage); poorly-paid employees (low damage); or victims of discrimination that is
subtle or difficult to grasp.
Nationally, such lawyers take few cases of race or national origin discrimination,
and their California counterparts are no different.  However, nationally, such lawyers
gravitate toward age discrimination cases, with their sympathetic plaintiffs, unlikely to
work again, suffering the losses of high income positions appropriate to their late stage in
the life cycle.   This makes the absence of such cases in the Valley more surprising.115
The Bay area, however, also contains an unusual number of lawyers who
conceptualize discrimination as something that happens to classes of people, particularly
ordinary working people, not just to affluent individuals.  I spoke to three of the ablest.
Patricia Shiu and Joan Graff are veteran plaintiffs' advocates at the Employment
Law Center, a project of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco.  Originally founded to
assist immigrants, the Center now specializes in all aspects of discrimination litigation on
behalf of poor and working people.  (It does not concern itself with "glass ceiling" issues
of promotion to or within managerial ranks).  It employs around twenty lawyers and does
not receive funds from the federal Legal Services Corporation.
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Its last case in Silicon Valley concerned Atari (which dates it fairly effectively), a
class action concerning its obligation before layoffs to inform workers under a California
statute that predated the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN)
Act.    Some of its other cases involve worker classification issues and thus might help
low-income workers in the Valley.  One involved a class of janitors misclassified as
independent contractors, settled (without published opinion) when their employer
reclassified them as employees.  In another, they cooperated with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission in a suit against a temporary help agency that was the vehicle
for its clients' race discrimination.116
They confirmed the difficulty in applying to Silicon Valley the kinds of
discrimination litigation they usually do, largely because of the high job mobility, lack of
loyalty, and low aspirations for workplace community.  People who feel discriminated
against either leave, or stay because they are making money, but don't fight.  But Joan
Graff thought that the absence of discrimination complaints in the Valley was a sign of a
weak sense of community (which she termed "narcissism").  Valley employees don't have
any sense of a larger community, she said, citing the recent bankruptcy of the United Way
of Santa Clara County.   All they care about is work, like the employees, discussed by117
Juliet Schor, who would rather stay at work than go home.   That makes work the only118
place left to be a community, the only place to overcome "narcissism."  But it's not a
community either, given the end of loyalty and short tenures.  In this environment, a focus
on nondiscrimination or workplace diversity or community will not succeed.
Barry Goldstein is a partner at the Oakland firm of Saperstein, Goldstein,
Demchak & Baller.  They do not bring individual discrimination suits, only class actions
or other attacks on systemic practices, and are famous for their suits reforming job
assignments at Home Depot, based largely on statistical disparities in men's and women's
assignments.    119
Goldstein agreed that many Valley employers had statistics that resembled Home
Depot's and said that his firm has considered suits in the Valley but never brought one. 
He pointed out some of the problems.  Companies do not really have entry-level positions. 
Where compensation is flexible, as it normally is for white-collar employees of all types,
it is difficult to frame a class of plaintiffs since courts often hold that individual issues will
predominate over the group's.  He suggested that sales might be an area of discrimination,
based on his representation of sales employees at a technology company in a different part
of the country, where none of the sales force had degrees in computer science and whites
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seemed to be making more money than African-Americans.  In that case, the clients
preferred that he send a confidential letter to the employer and then work together with the
employer on fairer sales assignments.  By contrast, he has never even sent such a letter, or
heard of one, in the Valley.  If there is any discrimination in sales assignments, he thought
it would reflect relations with purchasing vice-presidents and other cultures in which
women or African-Americans might not "fit in."  He also told me that Asians of all types
in the Bay area labor market simply do not sue.  In the entire history of his firm, during
which they have always had Asian lawyers in the office, they have brought only one case
on behalf of Asian plaintiffs, against the San Francisco Fire Department.
I'll return to some of these points below.  I've given a fuller account of these
interviews to dispel any notion that the absence of discrimination suits in the Valley
reflects a lack of imagination or courage by lawyers.   I do not believe any area of the
country has more thoughtful or courageous lawyers practicing employment law, either on
behalf of employees, or employers.
B. Legal obstacles
In the book, I discussed some of the difficulties in deciding whether one state's law
is really different from another's.  It is necessary to examine both formal law "on the
books," and informal aspects of the sociology of litigation.  Both turned out to be essential
to understanding why employees are normally free to depart Silicon Valley firms and start
competing firms.  That is, formal California law prohibits enforcement of covenants not to
compete.  Understanding the trade secret story required understanding social factors. 
Formal trade secret law in California is little different from other states' (it has the same
Uniform Statute but does not give independent weight to negotiated trade secret
agreements), and interpretations of that statute have been adopted by courts inside and
outside California that would make it the functional equivalent of enforcing noncompetes. 
Nevertheless, employers rarely sue, because such suits cause them reputational harm,
rarely succeed, and threaten them as hirers as well as losers of labor.120
 Does California law provide any formal or informal obstacles to civil rights
plaintiffs?  We can be definitive that there are no formal obstacles.  Federal civil rights
laws against race, sex, and age discrimination apply as minima in all states.  States may
extend additional protection to plaintiffs, and, as mentioned, California has, to age
discrimination plaintiffs.  They are allowed to proceed under state law by showing that a
putatively neutral employment practice, such as targeting highly-paid employees for
layoff, has a "disparate impact" on older workers.    There has been little reported121
litigation under this statute, enacted in 1999.  It is hard to believe that it means what it
says.  A job description that requires Java programming certainly has a "disparate impact"
against older employers.  California courts will eventually have to define what kinds of
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business justifications will support such practices with "disparate impact" against older
workers.
 My interviews disclosed only one informal aspect of California law that might
discourage discrimination suits, and even this is impressionistic and mostly understood as
a modest change from a past practice that may have encouraged such suits.  Bay area
juries used to have a reputation for being generous to victims of all kind of legal harm,
including accident plaintiffs as well as discrimination plaintiffs.  Many observers believe
that this is less the case as San Francisco in particular becomes less working-class, more
professional class.  However, high-velocity labor markets are also blamed.   Karen Jo
Koonan of the National Jury Project/West in Oakland observes the influence of New
Economy workers in employment cases.  "Dot-commers jump from job to job" and "have
no sense that the employers owe anything to the employees."    The converse may also122
be true.  Dot-commers also think that employees owe no duties of loyalty or
confidentiality to employers, at least where this would inhibit their own employability and
the employer undertakes no reciprocal duties to employ them.  However, it does not
appear that even these dot-commers are less generous than juries elsewhere, as opposed to
San Francisco juries in former times.
C. Social obstacles to discrimination suits
In general, people won't sue to protect their rights against discrimination
if there are other jobs to be had, or if they can leave and start their own
company.  They sue when they are about to lose late-career jobs paying above
opportunity wage.  So much employment discrimination litigation is
endogenous to internal labor markets.  The internal labor market creates the job that
is the subject of the typical discrimination suit.
 In a dynamic and expanding economy, employees who lose or fail to get a job due
to prejudice normally get a different, better job.  As Henry Farber has shown, this is true
for job losses in information technology in general, comparing older information
technology professionals with younger.    Farber’s data include job losses for many123
reasons, including incompetence or poor performance.  Perhaps he has hold of two
offsetting trends.  There is some stereotyping against older professionals in information
technology, that results in some job losses, and longer job searches, that younger workers
would not experience.  But by the same token, for older workers, job loss is less likely to
signal incompetence.  Those older workers have a persuasive explanation of some of those
job losses that younger workers would not—they were forced out because of
discrimination.  (This particularly matters if the job lost was at an information technology
employer that normally offers somewhat stable employment but chose not to do so for this
individual.  Nobody has to explain being laid off from most Silicon Valley employers). 
So most information technology workers who lost jobs, even for illegal reasons, were
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able, at least in the 1990s, to find other jobs and were not stigmatized by the illegal
discrimination.
  By contrast, suing that former employer in a discrimination suit could have a
powerful negative impact on future employability, powerful in a high-velocity labor
market in which employees are back on the job market every eighteen months or two
years.  Lawsuits and lawyers are not well-regarded in the Valley, which also believes
itself, with considerable justification, to be meritocratic.  Network hiring, with its heavy
emphasis on colleagues’ and intermediaries’ vouching for specific individuals, makes it
easy to retaliate against people with reputations as troublemakers.   So long as victims of
discrimination can get other jobs, they have every incentive to do so, and little incentive to
pursue legal remedies.  It has been suggested that the US economy generally might be
able to keep unemployment rates low through adopting more high-velocity work
practices.   If this is so, one might see similar decreases in discrimination suits across the124
economy.
 It is harder to explain why employees at the very end of their careers don't sue.  I
think there are not many such employees who are really victims of discrimination.   Even
in the 1990s, the woods did not seem to be full of unemployed or underemployed older
programmers who would really have preferred that decade's programming jobs to their
current occupation, whatever it was.  
  
 In the US in 1990s, essentially no new net jobs were created in traditional internal
labor markets. Manufacturing employment declined and public employment held steady. 
All new net jobs were in the services.  Some of these jobs in the services were extremely
remunerative (the expanding information technology, financial, and legal sectors) and
some were not.  While there is no good statistical proxy for traditional internal labor
markets, it appears to me that few were in traditional internal labor markets with implicit
contracts for lifetime employment.  As fewer such jobs are created and existing jobs
disappear, discrimination law will either change or die.
 Silicon Valley’s labor market challenges many ways in which lawyers and
economists have understood labor markets, but no challenge is greater, or more
intellectually difficult, than its challenge to our legal and conceptual apparatus for
understanding discrimination and equal opportunity.  If law does not change, Silicon
Valley will continue to be essentially all white and Asian, and disproportionately young. 
In the book from which this chapter is drawn, I largely defend high-velocity labor
markets.  I argue throughout the book that there is a national interest in growth and
innovation that supports such legal institutions as bans on covenants not to compete,
narrow enforcement of trade secrets, self-employment, temporary help agencies, and H-
1B visas.   It is more difficult to defend high-velocity labor markets if they will forever125
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exclude African-Americans and Latinos in significant numbers.  It is tempting to suggest
that law should be less focused on discrimination and more on job creation and growth,
but it is simply hypocritical to say this if one knows that such growth policies will not help
African-Americans or Latinos.
 Even if existing legal tools were more widely used, they would still not bring
African-Americans or Latinos into the Valley’s labor market.  Statistical proofs of
discrimination don’t work in industries in which no employer hires many members of
minority groups.  Other statistical proofs would at best trigger employer obligations to126
explain disparate outcomes.   Since narrow skill requirements are probably easier to127
defend than network hiring, more legal scrutiny of employment might result in even
stricter skill requirements at hiring, and the loss of the valuable informational functions of
the Valley’s labor market intermediaries.  None of these strategies would accomplish
anything if, as is true today, potential victims of discrimination do not sue.
  In order for law to bring African-Americans and Latinos into high technology, it
would have to become more intrusive in ways that might lose public support and might
stifle some of the Valley’s flexibility and information-based institutions.  Law could, for
example, mandate more rigid quotas, particularly for government contractors; or make
statistical proof of discrimination easier (by rejecting most explanations of it); or insist on
duties to train employees and applicants in protected groups before hiring individuals on
H-1B visas.  Any of these policies would represent a major change in the Valley’s
distinctive labor market, moving it away from the flexibility represented by short-term
hiring for specific existing skills, and by networks and other intermediaries, and toward
traditional labor markets that are simply less productive of high technology growth and
innovation.  Again, if a national consensus ever developed in favor of restoring older labor
markets, it could be implemented by restricting temporary and self-employment, and
enforcing covenants not to compete and trade secrets agreements, at considerable cost to
innovation and wealth creation. Critics of high-velocity labor markets and advocates for
more traditional labor markets, typically minimize the costs imposed by such markets,
which include excessive termination of employees and insufficient adjustment; legal and
other battles over the rents accruing to such fixed jobs; and too much aggregate
unemployment.  I also doubt that there would be much public support for policies like
quotas, discrimination suits based entirely on statistics, or conscripting employers to train.
However since African-Americans as employees benefit little from the labor market
innovations of a high-velocity labor market (although they benefit along with all
consumers of information technology), they might favor such labor market reforms.
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V. Public policy initiatives to open up high-tech jobs to excluded groups: African-
Americans, for simplicity
I see no easy solution to this problem, and none that emerges entirely within the
realm of what we have traditionally regarded as the law of discrimination.  I have also
considered and rejected two other policies sometimes advocated on antidiscrimination
grounds.  I do not favor either a national policy favoring traditional internal labor markets,
or a major cut in the H-1B visa program, at least on an antidiscrimination rationale. 
Eliminating the H-1B program entirely would create the most opportunities for
programmers in India and Ireland; a few opportunities for older programmers; and none at
all for African-Americans and Latinos.  
I therefore favor experimentation with a variety of other public policy initiatives. 
The goal would be to find levels of information technology at which African-Americans
and Latinos might feasibly be employed, and then preferably to create incentives for
employers to find ways of doing so.  The problem of disparate labor market outcomes will
test Silicon Valley's high-velocity labor market.  In theory, its distinctive labor market
institutions, ideal for transmitting information, providing incentives to employees, and
creating wealth, should be able to address problems of disparate labor market outcomes
with an efficacy unknown to present approaches.   
A. Create incentives for employers to improve the numbers. 
 Large information technology employers that receive government contracts are
subject to formal affirmative action requirements and informal pressure.  Before
subjecting all employers to more liability for statistical discrimination, we should try more
targeted pressure on particular employers, that can afford to do so, to improve their hiring
from excluded groups.   They would be given relatively free reign to design recruitment
and training programs.  Those that were effective could become more widespread.  In
evaluating results, law would have to be sensitive to the aspects of a high-velocity labor
market that make genuine contribution to growth.   For example, regulators should be
responsive to employer programs that create opportunities for African-American
contractors or “permatemps,” if the employer is already making use of these contracts and
the opportunities are genuine.  Obviously if such requirements affect rates of economic
and technological growth, they will not be developed further, but there is no reason to
assume in advance that no progress is possible here. 
B. Hi-tech solutions to high-tech problems.  
 As with retirement plans and health insurance, there is a lamentable gap between
the creativity that has gone into the design of some aspects of high-velocity work practices
while ignoring others.   Perhaps some existing institutions can be adapted to serve equal128
employment opportunity.  Internet job boards and job sites for African-American, or
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older, employees could help demonstrate that such individuals are available.  Of course, as
we have seen, internet job sites appear to reinforce meritocracy, but with so many resumes
available, make contacts and networks even more important.  This creates opportunities
for temporary help agencies and advocacy groups focused on older or African-American
workers.
 Some Silicon Valley employers have developed distinctive ways of organizing
human resources (besides outsourcing to a temp agency).  Susan Sturm describes human
resources problem-solvers at Intel, delegated unusual authority to treat human resources
complaints as symptoms of deeper problems, then work on the problems.  These are
probably unique to Intel and would not export easily.    Intel is an unusual Silicon Valley129
employer.  Its core business is to dominate chips for personal computers, and in that
aspect of its business, it is more interested in stability and maintaining its dominance than
are most Valley employers.  (Intel also was on a buying spree in the late 1990s to find
some market to dominate other than the personal computer, but none of those acquisitions
yet plays anything like the role of its core business).  Intel, to an extent possibly unique in
Silicon Valley, is a place at which people make careers, where departing employees may
well face trade secrets suits (invariably unsuccessful), and product lines may well be
moved to remote locations with few other high-tech opportunities to tempt departing Intel
employees.    Intel also describes itself as unusually “paranoid” about outside scrutiny.  130 131
While its human resource problem solvers may have many achievements to their credit,
employment opportunities for members of minority groups are not among them.  Intel's
statistics are if anything worse than most Valley employers.   132
C. Equal employment for careers, not within single employers
 If there ever are discrimination suits against employers in networks, like Silicon
Valley’s, counsel, in seeking relief, must be sensitive to the networked aspect of
contemporary careers.  Law needs a period of experimentation with remedies for
discrimination that cross firm lines.  These might include several firms agreeing to fund
particular training efforts, or a new placement agency.  Perhaps a victim of discrimination
might receive funding from the discriminatory employer for her own startup, rather than
accept a promotion from that employer.  I cannot report on successful efforts here.  There
aren’t any.  It will take some time to learn what works.
 A basic problem is that artificial cooperation among entities in a network is never
as effective as the kind of natural cooperation that is the subject of the book, the natural
sharing of information, cooperation among firms in bringing products to market,
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technology licensing and second sourcing, and the like.  For example, consider the failure
of the Talent Alliance.   AT&T, after announcing the elimination of forty thousand
managerial positions in 1996, “proposed to a group of `peer corporations’ that they form a
network to help laid-off employees find work more easily and conversely to help the
companies find the right talent quickly.  It seemed an exciting idea at the time: fourteen
large companies jumped quickly on the bandwagon, including leaders such as DuPont,
Johnson & Johnson, and UPS….”  However, the idea never got “off the ground.”  No
employers joined after the initial group, at least one dropped out, and fewer than ten
people were ever placed through this network.  133
 
 Similarly, if the EEOC somehow found the resources to sue the ten or twenty
largest firms in Silicon Valley alleging disparate treatment in hiring for some positions
without rigid entry requirements, it (just) might be able to win a suit.  I am suggesting,
though, that if it did, it would still not know what to ask for in relief.   Would a decree
requiring hiring (perhaps by contractors, monitored by the large firms) of a certain number
of African-American cablers accomplish anything?  Would it result six months later in a
lot of unemployed cablers?  Or would this be a “foot in the door” that would alter lives
and aspirations for many individuals not even the subject of the decree?  
 A “Talent Alliance” linking large Valley employers under EEOC decree might
seem like a good remedy if all were found to have discriminated.  It might work, or might
be as unused at AT&T’s.   I have been urging further study of how people really match
with jobs in a world of networked careers, internet job boards, new labor market
intermediaries, and the like.  I stress that this is not some academic ritualized professing of
humility; it is necessary if we are to think straight about problems of equity and
discrimination.
D. Equity in business contracting
  Increasing the density of African-American programmers, engineers, and
scientists calls for thinking over the extremely long term—the opposite of “internet time.” 
There are few such individuals now and no trend toward their increase.  Certainly the US
should target science and tech education for minorities.  
 It seems desirable to me to find nontechnical niches in the information technology
industry that would be more feasible targets for shorter-term integration.  If one
generation of African-Americans works somewhere in information technology, learning
the players and some of the vocabulary, it seems more likely that their children will aspire
to higher jobs in the industry, like cars in Detroit, though there is little relevant literature
on the point.  Finally, since companies do not maintain promotion ladders up from entry-
level positions, targeted positions should be those that are often held by the self-employed.
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A strategy of using public policy and funds to encourage subcontracting to
minority-owned contractors accomplishes several goals, since business ownership is
especially low among African-Americans.   However, existing African-American small
business owners employ workforces that are overwhelmingly African-American.134
Application by government of antidiscrimination and affirmative action principles to
business contracting raises difficult constitutional issues that I cannot explore here, but
that do not constrain voluntary efforts by employers.  There is much to be gained from
modest experiments to create more African-American entrepreneurs running technician,
service, and outsourced manufacturing businesses, particularly if these could be carried
out by companies, with public participation limited to technical assistance grants and the
like.   The modal existing self-employed African-American male is a truck driver.   135
Channeling more distribution work to them is a very feasible first step.
E. H-1B Technical Skill Training Grant Program Grants
 Employers who apply for H1-B visas since the last Congressional reauthorization
of the program now pay a $1000 fee, much of which is used for targeted technical training
of minority technicians and repair people.  This has turned out to be a very good program. 
It creates some rewards to human capital investment by African-Americans and could
yield the fabled "foot in the door" of the information technology industry that is currently
lacking.   Minority repair people and technicians may, over time, found their own small
businesses.  By watching them, we will learn things about how to open opportunities in a
high-velocity labor market.
 This program, however, was sold to Congress under the inaccurate claim that such
training would alleviate the need for H-1B visas.  This is inaccurate because H1-Bs are
normally programmers and engineers, not repairers or technicians.  In my view, a program
to train minority repair persons and technicians is nevertheless an excellent program; over
the very long term it will help readjust minority attitudes toward education and their place
in the information technology industry.  Since companies still apply for the maximum
number of H-1B visas even when there are many unemployed programmers already
documented to work, requiring them to train minority technicians is a very modest return
request.   However, the Bush administration has sought to abolish the training136
program.137
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